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Executive Summary 
The international climate change conference occurring in Paris at the end of 2015 
presents an important opportunity for governments to negotiate a new international 
climate agreement. A question of central importance to negotiators and observers is: 
what kind of policy architecture — what policy, legal and institutional structure — is 
likely to be most effective in generating sufficient emissions reductions to restrain 
global climate change to within relatively safe levels?  
Some important insights inform the answer to this question: 
• As there is no world government, states can choose whether or not to 
participate in, and be legally bound by, international treaties (and whether or 
not to continue participating); 
• International cooperation can helpfully change states’ incentives to reduce 
emissions, coordinate policies and expectations, collect and diffuse helpful 
information, and foster new norms; 
• However, domestic (political, economic, technical and other) factors arguably 
have a much greater influence on countries’ climate policies than international 
cooperation; 
• A highly centralised, relatively binding policy architecture (like that in the 
Kyoto Protocol) has the theoretical advantage of increasing the likelihood that 
the countries that choose to participate will meet their commitments, but 
arguably this effect is modest and outweighed by a bigger, negative effect — 
namely that strongly binding agreements can preclude the participation or 
depress the ambition of large, systemically important emitters, particularly the 
United States and China; 
• In any case, when the full costs and benefits of mitigation actions are 
considered, a strongly binding and centralised architecture no longer appears 
to be the best approach for every sector and every aspect of mitigation: 
o A large pool of emissions in most countries could be reduced in ways 
that would bring relatively certain local net-benefits, thanks to the 
declining costs of many low/zero-carbon substitutes and the co-
benefits, such as cleaner air, they tend to bring (with many of these 
benefits accruing in the short- to medium-term and enduring) — but 
international cooperation could help to reduce political and technical 
barriers to the realisation of these emissions reductions; 
o A significant pool of emissions reductions would become locally net-
beneficial over the medium- to long-term through investments in 
low/zero-carbon innovation (which would also likely bring wider 
economic benefits) — but international cooperation could help to 
overcome the partly-global-public-good character of innovation, and to 
increase its effectiveness through coordination; 
o A further pool of mitigation options would remain locally net-costly — 
but these are likely to be concentrated in particular sectors, so 
international cooperation could be better targeted sectorally.   
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The emerging policy architecture for agreement in Paris 2015 suggests that 
negotiators and key observers have heeded a number of these insights. Importantly, 
states’ emissions reduction contributions will be “nationally-determined”, and are 
unlikely to be legally binding under international law. This is likely to enable the 
participation, and increase the ambition, of the largest, systemically important 
emitters, including China and the United States, and therefore increase the collective 
ambition across all countries. The credibility of these nationally-determined 
contributions can be enhanced by a greater focus at the international level on their 
implementation into states’ domestic laws and policies, and on mechanisms to 
promote the transparent measurement, reporting and verification of their fulfilment. 
 
Whatever the architecture agreed upon, the level of ambition ultimately embodied in 
states’ emissions reduction contributions in Paris will almost certainly be insufficient 
to avoid high risks of grave climate change impacts. However, the Paris agreement is 
likely to incorporate mechanisms to facilitate the increasing ambition of states over 
time — and we can reasonably expect such increasing ambition, given continued 
favourable changes in technology, relative prices, and politics. These dynamic 
elements of the Paris architecture will be critical to the effectiveness of the 
agreement over the long term. 
 
Primarily for the above reasons, the Paris conference, and anticipated agreement, 
looks set to be desirably different from past major climate conferences/agreements. 
 
There remains, however, considerable scope for effective international climate 
cooperation that extends well beyond what seems likely to be included in the main 
Paris agreement. In particular, narrower coalitions of countries could achieve deeper 
gains by cooperating in particular sectoral, technology or policy areas. Such 
coalitions could usefully articulate a medium-term goal of decarbonising the global 
electricity sector before 2050, and could work to achieve it by agreeing to phase-out 
the consumption and production of coal, and to scale-up and better coordinate 
low/zero-carbon energy innovation. These cooperative measures could be integrated 
into the formal UN process in various ways, but in the near term they may need to be 
advanced by willing countries (in Paris or otherwise) ‘on the side’ of the formal 
negotiations. 
 
Ultimately, international cooperation can at best accelerate countries’ domestic 
transition to a zero-carbon economy. Each country and its citizens must find its own 
way to achieve a deep, timely and just transition. Paris 2015 looks like it will help. But 
the hardest work will remain to be done. 
  
6 
 
Contents 
 
Executive Summary .................................................................................................. 4 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 7 
a) What the Paris conference is about ............................................................. 7 
b) What this paper is about .............................................................................. 8 
2. International Climate Cooperation: Who, Why and How? .................................. 9 
a) Who? States and the nature of public international law ............................... 9 
b) Why? Incentives, coordination, knowledge and norms ................................ 9 
c) How? The role of ‘policy architectures’ ...................................................... 11 
i) Policy Structure ......................................................................................... 11 
ii) Centralisation......................................................................................... 11 
iii) Bindingness ........................................................................................... 12 
iv) Evaluating architectures ........................................................................ 13 
3. Two key considerations for designing an effective international policy 
architecture ............................................................................................................. 14 
a) The interplay between international architecture and domestic factors ...... 14 
i) The interplay between international bindingness and domestic ambition and 
credibility ......................................................................................................... 15 
ii) The interplay between policy structure and ambition .............................. 18 
b) The costs and benefits of action ................................................................ 19 
i) Local co-benefits ....................................................................................... 20 
ii) Dynamic innovation effects .................................................................... 21 
iii) Residual, locally net-costly mitigation .................................................... 22 
4. The emerging policy architecture for an agreement in Paris 2015 and its likely 
effectiveness ........................................................................................................... 22 
a) “Intended nationally-determined contributions” .......................................... 23 
b) The form of commitments: promoting credibility and coordination ............. 23 
c) Transparency, review and participation ..................................................... 24 
d) (Upward) revision of commitments ............................................................ 25 
e) A long-term goal ........................................................................................ 26 
f) Finance, Technology and Capacity-Building ................................................. 27 
5. Beyond the Paris Agreement: Additional international initiatives and a just 
domestic transition .................................................................................................. 27 
a) International initiatives for ‘narrower and deeper’ cooperation ................... 27 
i) A medium-term goal for electricity sector decarbonisation ......................... 28 
ii) Phasing out coal .................................................................................... 29 
iii) Zero carbon energy innovation .............................................................. 30 
b) Domestic implications of a more decentralised international architecture: A 
just transition ....................................................................................................... 30 
6. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 31 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 33 
 
7 
 
1. Introduction 
a) What the Paris conference is about 
From 30 November to 11 December 2015, representatives of 195 national 
governments and tens of thousands of civil society observers will descend on Paris, 
France for the innocuous-sounding, but highly important, 21st Conference of the 
Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).1 It is widely hoped that this will be the conference at which a new 
international agreement is negotiated setting out how countries will cooperate to 
tackle climate change. 
The science of climate change is clear: without urgent action to curb the increasing 
flows of greenhouse gas emissions and then reduce them rapidly over the coming 
few decades, it is highly unlikely that greenhouse gas concentrations will stabilise at 
a level to which most countries and natural systems could adapt safely.2 In essence, 
the purpose of the Paris conference is to agree on a set of principles, rules, 
measures and institutions equitably to reduce emissions (mitigation) and adapt to 
expected climate change (adaptation), with a particular emphasis on the actions to 
be taken, and outcomes to be achieved, after 2020. The provision of international 
support for finance, technology and capacity building (FTCB), which relates to both 
mitigation and adaptation, will be another important aspect of the negotiations. 
The formal negotiations within the UNFCCC will involve large plenary sessions and 
many smaller meetings, carried out within the institutions of the UNFCCC.3 In these 
meetings, government negotiators — often negotiating in blocs defined by shared 
interests or priorities4 — will negotiate the language of proposed decisions and 
agreements. The negotiations will be conducted according to the convention that all 
decisions be made by consensus (this effectively means that every country has the 
power to veto any decision).5  
But the Paris conference is about more than the UNFCCC. Much action will occur ‘on 
the side’ of the formal negotiations. This will include less formal meetings between 
smaller groups of countries, some of whom may make additional announcements 
about initiatives for international climate cooperation beyond the UNFCCC. Non-state 
actors — including sub-national governments, businesses and industry, researchers, 
environmental non-government organisations (NGOs), trade unions and other civil 
society groups — will also play a significant role throughout the conference. In the 
formal negotiations, a number of such groups have official status, affording them the 
opportunity to attend and make pre-agreed interventions in plenary sessions with a 
view to influencing the substantive negotiations. They will also lobby negotiators 
ahead and on the side of the negotiations.  
                                            
1
 The UNFCCC was the first international climate change treaty. It was agreed at the Rio 
Earth Summit in 1992 and entered into force in 1995. Somewhat confusingly, ‘UNFCCC’ can 
refer to the Convention (i.e. the treaty) or to the processes and institutions established by or 
under the Convention. The intended meaning is usually clear from the context. 
2
 See IPCC (2013, 2014b). 
3
 See UNFCCC Secretariat (2014a). 
4
 See UNFCCC Secretariat (2014b). 
5
 The UNFCCC operates under “provisional rules of procedure”, which have never been 
formally adopted due to disagreements about the rules. By default, a consensus principle has 
been applied to decision-making. 
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b) What this paper is about 
How can countries best structure their cooperative interactions to promote the 
effective mitigation of climate change, in line with the objective of stabilising 
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at relatively safe levels? Or, in the 
jargon of international relations, how can the international climate change ‘policy 
architecture’ be most ‘effective’ (in regard to mitigation)?6 This issue will be front and 
centre in Paris. Specifically, participants will need to consider: the appropriate legal 
form of a new climate agreement (a formal legal agreement, or a mere political 
agreement) and the ‘bindingness’ of the particular provisions within it; the institutional 
arrangements the agreement adopts (e.g. for monitoring and enforcing compliance); 
the policy structure it adopts (focusing on ‘ends’ or ‘means’, the role of FTCB etc.). 
And they will need to consider how these various elements affect the ambition and 
credibility of countries’ commitments.  
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (i) to provide a theoretical framework for 
analysing international climate policy architectures and their effectiveness, covering 
each of these elements and issues, drawing on the relevant academic literature; and 
(ii) to apply insights from this discussion to the anticipated policy architecture of the 
Paris 2015 agreement (which is emerging in the ongoing negotiations leading up to 
Paris) and suggest additional cooperative actions that could be taken. The paper 
argues that the emerging architecture for Paris is, if agreed, likely to be relatively 
effective, at least compared with the architectures of previous UN climate 
agreements. However, the paper will also argue that there are further areas in which 
international climate cooperation could be effective, which are less likely to be 
captured in the main agreement in Paris.  
The paper is structured as follows. Part 2 begins with first principles, providing a 
basic introduction to the fundamental concepts in international relations and 
international law as relevant to international cooperation on climate change, including 
the concept of a ‘policy architecture’ and how it can be evaluated. Part 3 discusses 
two key considerations for designing an effective climate policy architecture: the 
interplay between various architectural elements and domestic factors; and the costs 
and benefits of mitigation actions. These considerations provide an important 
counterpoint to the oft-cited claim that, to be effective, international climate 
cooperation must take the form of a “legally binding treaty”. 
The second half of the paper applies the insights from Parts 2 and 3 to draw 
conclusions about the effectiveness of potential international policy architectures. 
Part 4 analyses the key mitigation-related elements of the emerging policy 
architecture for agreement in Paris and suggests some ways in which these 
elements could be made more effective. Part 5 looks beyond the main Paris 
agreement: first, to consider some additional, potentially effective, international 
cooperative initiatives that could be advanced ‘on the side’ of the Paris negotiations 
that could improve the effectiveness of international cooperation; and second, to 
highlight the primary importance of a deep and just transition to a zero carbon 
economy within countries, which is the corollary of having a less centralised 
international architecture at the UN level. Part 6 concludes. 
                                            
6
 Of course, the Paris conference will cover a great deal many more issues than mitigation 
(most notably, it will cover adaptation), and the Paris outcome should be judged not only by 
its likely effectiveness, but also by the fairness and efficiency of the outcome. However, in a 
paper of this size, it is not possible to cover all of these issues.  
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2. International Climate Cooperation: Who, Why and How? 
This section provides a brief overview of some relevant concepts in international 
relations and international law. This discussion, covering actors, their reasons for 
cooperation, and the role of policy architectures in effecting cooperation, provides 
critical background for the paper’s subsequent analysis and argument. For example, 
one cannot evaluate an argument for the Paris agreement to be “legally binding” 
without some understanding of what this means in the context of the unusual legal 
system that exists at the international level, and without considering the specific 
purpose of the desired international cooperation. 
a) Who? States and the nature of public international law 
The most fundamental feature of international relations is that there is no ‘world 
government’. There is no single legal entity with authority to make global policy; no 
global parliament to pass global legislation; no global executive to implement and 
administer the law; and no global court system to interpret and enforce the law. 
Rather, the primary actors7 on the international stage are states.8  
The system of law known as public international law to some extent regulates the 
conduct of states, but the absence of world government means it is a fundamentally 
different system of law from the domestic legal systems of states like the Untied 
Kingdom. Since there is no world government, public international law is the outcome 
of the voluntary cooperative actions of states — most importantly, through treaties or 
other international legal agreements.9 States can thus create international climate 
change ‘law’ (of a kind) and institutions, but their participation in such laws and 
institutions is ultimately voluntary, and therefore dependant on ongoing mutual 
cooperation among states.10 This reality has important implications for the design of 
international institutions and agreements for responding to climate change. 
b) Why? Incentives, coordination, knowledge and norms 
Reasons why states might wish to cooperate on climate change can be classified as 
follows (the four reasons discussed here are not mutually exclusive, but emphasise 
different potential motivations): 
1. Incentives — From an economic perspective, climate change can be 
characterised as a ‘global collective action problem’.11 Wherever greenhouse 
gas emissions are produced, they mix globally in the atmosphere; thus, where 
actions in one country reduce emissions, the climate benefits (i.e. reduced 
climate risks/impacts) accrue globally.12 States (or individuals or firms) that 
                                            
7
 As the world has globalised, non-state actors have become increasingly prominent on the 
international stage (see, e.g., Mathews 1997; Slaughter 2004), including with regard to 
climate change (see, e.g., Newell 2006). However, there are challenges associated with 
bringing non-state actors within the state-centric system of public international law (see, e.g., 
Green 2008). This paper focuses on international (state-state) cooperation.  
8
 In the parlance of international relations and international law, the term ‘state’ is used to 
refer to what we would, in plain English, refer to as ‘countries’. These terms are used 
interchangeably throughout this paper. References to states in this paper are intended to 
include the European Union in its capacity as a UNFCCC member where applicable. 
9
 A second primary source of international law is so-called ‘customary international law’, which 
evolves from the widespread practices of states: see, e.g., Brownlie (2008, ch 1.3).  
10
 See IPCC (2014a, p 17). 
11
 IPCC (2014a, pp 8–9). Clearly, climate change is a global problem. However, the framing of 
climate change as a global collective action problem, or at least as one single global collective 
action problem, is theoretically contestable, even if it is widely accepted as such. Some 
reasons for possible contestation are discussed in Part 3(b), below. 
12
 IPCC (2014a, pp 8–9). 
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take action will therefore not be able to appropriate the full benefits of those 
actions — and in many cases, those actions will also incur private costs. This 
creates incentives for states (and individuals and firms) to underinvest in 
emissions reduction measures, and potentially to ‘free-ride’ on the actions of 
others.13 International cooperation can help to change these incentives so that 
individual countries invest more in mitigation (or free-ride less) than they 
otherwise would.14 
2. Coordination — Through international cooperation, states can coordinate their 
responses to climate change. They can agree on goals, principles, rules, 
institutions, policies, measures, targets and so on, and can allocate 
responsibilities among one another. Such coordination can improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency15 of climate policy by generating clearer global 
signals about future policy, reducing opportunities for international ‘leakage’ of 
production from one jurisdiction to another, and lowering transaction costs.16 
Such coordination can also improve the distributional incidence of costs and 
benefits, through allocating entitlements and responsibilities internationally in 
accordance with ethical principles.17 And it can facilitate the provision of 
assistance to countries that need it — notably FTCB support. 
3. Knowledge — International climate cooperation can have epistemic benefits. 
Through international cooperation, states can collect and aggregate 
information from disparate sources — for example, regarding climate science, 
emissions sources, mitigation actions and their effectiveness etc. — and can 
facilitate its diffusion among governments and non-state actors.18 And they 
can gain knowledge and experience through cooperative interactions. 
Enhanced knowledge, in turn, can help to improve the performance of future 
policy (e.g. through a process of experimentation and “social learning”),19 
change the interests of relevant actors,20 build trust among states,21 and 
empower domestic actors.22 
4. Norms — international climate cooperation can lead to the evolution of 
widely-shared international standards, principles or rules (i.e. ‘norms’) that 
                                            
13
 However, whether free-riding actually occurs depends on many things, including the 
specific cost-benefit profile (including co-benefits) for any particular action (as to which, see 
Part 3(b)), and the motivations of the actor. 
14
 Including, at least in theory, by the cooperative development of mechanisms to “internalise” 
the costs of emitting greenhouse gases into market prices, and/or by establishing legal rules, 
backed by sanctions, which incentivise compliance: see IPCC (2014a, p 9). 
15
 That is, it can have economic advantages in the form of increased overall social benefits 
and/or reduced costs relative to uncoordinated action. Economists refer to two kinds of 
efficiency in this context: “maximising global net benefits”; and the notion of “cost-
effectiveness”, which “allows for policies with the same level of performance in terms of 
aggregate benefits to be compared on the dimension of aggregate cost” (IPCC 2014a, p 10). 
16
 IPCC (2014a, ch 13.3.3); GCEC (2014, pp 278–280). 
17
 In economics, and in the parlance of international climate negotiations, such principles are 
often framed within the rubric of “equity”, which “emphasizes distributive justice across and 
within countries and across and within generations” (IPCC 2014, p 10). 
18
 Meyer (2013); Dai (2010); Haas et al. (1993). 
19
 IPCC (2014a, p 74); Ostrom (2009, 2010); Meyer (2013). See also Hafner-Burton et al. 
(2012, p 87) and sources there cited for a discussion of the epistemic benefits of international 
cooperation generally. 
20
 Haas et al. (1993). 
21
 See Bell et al. (2013), Haas et al. (1993) and Keohane (1984, 1989) on how cooperative 
institutions can provide states with information about one another’s performance, on which 
they can build mutual trust (and so facilitate deeper cooperation). 
22
 Dai (2010); Haas et al. (1993). 
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can affect the behaviour of state and non-state actors.23 Norms influence 
state behaviour by signalling standards of appropriate behaviour, reflecting 
the expectations of others, which create social pressures to conform and 
provide a benchmark for judgement (by other states and by non-state 
actors).24 Norms can be, but need not be, legally binding. In the context of 
international relations, where enforcement and sanction mechanisms of 
international law are generally much weaker than under domestic legal 
systems, the distinction between legally-binding and mere political norms is, 
in practice, not so clear cut — international law derives much of its effect from 
its ‘normative power’, just as political norms do.25 
c) How? The role of ‘policy architectures’ 
While there are many reasons for cooperating internationally on climate change, the 
absence of world government means states must choose how they cooperate. In the 
literature on international climate cooperation, which mostly focuses on multilateral 
cooperation (i.e. between many states), this is typically treated as the question of the 
appropriate international policy architecture.26 Policy architecture refers to “the basic 
nature and structure of an international agreement or other multilateral (or bilateral) 
climate regime”.27  
A wide variety of climate architectures has been proposed.28 They can usefully be 
classified along three dimensions: policy structure; centralisation of authority; and 
legal bindingness. 
i) Policy Structure 
One important feature of a policy architecture is its policy structure, which can be 
thought of as the way policy commitments are framed. For example, a policy 
structure might focus on the ends to be achieved, such as the ultimate goals of 
cooperation and the output targets to be achieved,29 and/or it could focus on the 
means of reducing emissions, for example carbon taxation, emissions trading, 
technology innovation policies, financial assistance, and so on.30 Other relevant 
aspects of the policy structure include the timeframes over which commitments are to 
be met, the rules and processes for monitoring/measuring, reporting and verifying 
(MRV) compliance, and the equitable principles by which responsibilities and 
entitlements are allocated. 
ii) Centralisation 
Another way to differentiate international climate policy architectures is in the extent 
to which they confer authority on a central institution to administer, interpret and/or 
                                            
23
 See Bodansky (2010, ch 5) for a good discussion of international environmental norms. 
24
 Haas et al. (1993); Hafner-Burton et al. (2012, p 54). On the role of norms in influencing 
state behaviour by empowering non-state actors, see Dai (2010).  
25
 The relationship between international norms and international law has to some extent 
been discussed in the literature on “hard” norms/law vs “soft” norms/law. See, e.g., Baxter 
(1980); Abbott et al. (2000); Abbott and Snidal (2000); Bodansky (2010); Guzman and Meyer 
(2010); Shelton (2006); Bodansky (2010).  
26
 See, e.g., IPCC (2014a, ch 13.4).  
27
 Aldy and Stavins (2010). See also Schmalensee (2010). 
28
 See, e.g., Aldy and Stavins (2010). 
29
 Goals are “long-term and systemic” whereas targets, which may or may not flow logically 
from the goals, are “near-term and specific” (IPCC 2014a, p 27). Targets can be classified 
according to whether they require absolute emissions cuts relative to a historical baseline, or 
reductions relative to economic output (emissions intensity targets) or to business-as-usual 
projections (IPCC 2014a, p 27). 
30
 IPCC (2014a, pp 27–29). 
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enforce the rules and processes to which states agree.31 Strongly centralised 
architectures confer a high degree of authority on institutions, for example giving 
them the power to interpret rules, settle disputes and enforce the outcome (as with 
the World Trade Organisation Dispute Settlement Body). A more moderate degree of 
centralisation might involve conferring authority on central institutions with regard to 
less intrusive functions, such as coordinating negotiations, gathering and 
disseminating information, providing advice and technical assistance, facilitating 
financial and technology transfers, and perhaps facilitating the MRV (but not 
enforcement) of compliance. Still more decentralised architectures might involve 
agreements by states to coordinate their policies, or directly link them (e.g. through 
regional scheme linkages between emissions trading schemes), but with little or no 
centralisation of authority.32  
iii) Bindingness 
A third differentiating feature, is the international legal ‘bindingness’ of the 
architecture. This is an area about which there is much conceptual confusion among 
non-experts, and as such it merits careful examination. 
There are two senses in which one can talk about the bindingness of an agreement: 
an absolute sense (binding or not?) and a relative sense (how binding?). 
First, one must consider whether an agreement is a legal agreement (in an absolute 
sense).33 Only legal agreements (such as treaties) can bind states, but not all written 
agreements concluded between states are legal agreements. Whether an 
agreement, as a whole, is a legal agreement or not depends on the intention of the 
states that negotiated it, which will usually be discernible from the text of the 
agreement itself.34 Legal agreements are thought to evince a higher degree of 
seriousness on the part of the contracting parties compared with mere political (non-
legal) agreements.35 
International legal agreements are, however, only legally binding on those states that 
consent to be bound by them (the absence of world government means that 
participation in international legal agreements is voluntary).36 Typically for multilateral 
treaties, consent is given via a two-stage process. Once the text of a new treaty is 
agreed (e.g. as a result of negotiations at an international conference), it will be 
‘opened for signature’. When a state signs the treaty (the first stage) it indicates its 
intention to be bound by the treaty, but it is not yet actually bound.37 States must 
ratify a treaty38 (the second stage) in order to be bound by it.39 A state is thus only 
                                            
31
 See IPCC (2014a, ch 13.4.1).  
32
 See IPCC (2014a, ch 13.4.1). 
33
 Norms of customary international law can also become legally binding. However, I leave 
that complication aside here and focus exclusively on agreements. 
34
 See Brownlie (2008, p 609). 
35
 See Rausitala (2005, p 502). 
36
 See Brownlie (2008, ch 27). 
37
 In the case of a treaty that requires ratification as a prerequisite for the state to become 
bound by it, signature of the treaty merely imposes an obligation on the state to refrain from 
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty: see Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, art 12. 
38
 Typically, this means an authorised member of the executive government of the state must 
deposit a signed “instrument of ratification” (a specially designated document) with the treaty 
depositary. See Brownlie (2008) and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts 11, 
14 and 16. Different states have different internal procedures for generating the authorisation 
required for ratification, as explained below.  
39
 Typically a treaty will only enter into force (and thus become binding on the states that have 
ratified it) when a certain number of states have ratified it.  
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bound by the terms of a treaty that it has ratified.40 Moreover, since participation is 
voluntary, states are typically lawfully entitled to withdraw from international 
agreements to which they are party, as Canada has done under the Kyoto Protocol.41 
Second, we can consider bindingness in a relative sense. In practice, different 
provisions of an international agreement can be binding to differing degrees. The 
degree of bindingness is a function of four factors:42 
1. The type of legal instrument, e.g., treaty, or protocol to a treaty;43 
2. Whether the provision of the treaty (or other instrument) is expressed in 
mandatory language (e.g., ‘shall’ or ‘must’ vs. ‘should’ or ‘aim’); 
3. The specificity with which the obligation is expressed, i.e. whether it is 
expressed in sufficient detail to accurately assess compliance; and  
4. The enforceability of the obligation, i.e. whether the treaty contains 
enforcement procedures, mechanisms, sanctions and so on; the stringency 
and credibility of those mechanisms; and whether non-compliance with the 
provision in question is subject to those mechanisms. 
It can readily be seen how questions of bindingness and centralisation are related: 
for a treaty provision to be strongly binding (i.e. encompassing (4)), a high degree of 
central institutional authority would be required. Accordingly, remaining discussions 
in this paper will typically consider bindingness and centralisation together. 
The implications of having diverse factors influence the degree of bindingness are 
summarised by the IPCC:44 
Across types of agreements, commitments may be more or less legally binding; for 
example, although treaties often contain mandatory commitments, a treaty may also 
contain hortatory provisions, such as aims and pledges, which are understood to be 
aspirational; while a political declaration may nonetheless contain provisions that 
raise strong expectations and consequences for failure (Raustiala, 2005). Some 
commitments may be specific and subject to monitoring and accountability, while 
others are vague and difficult to verify (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). Further, across 
types of agreements, the enforcement mechanism may be weak or rigorous, ranging 
from inaction to admonishments to trade sanctions to military force. 
Because agreement participation is voluntary and the question of bindingness so 
complex and nuanced, the common claim that an international climate agreement 
should be “legally binding”, without elaboration, is not a very meaningful or helpful 
one.  
iv) Evaluating architectures 
There are various criteria by which one could evaluate a particular policy 
architecture.45 I will be focusing on one such criterion: effectiveness, i.e. the extent to 
                                            
40
 And which has entered into force (see previous footnote). 
41
 Often, an agreement will itself contain a clause relating to withdrawal. See, e.g., article 27 
of the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was negotiated in 1997 and 
entered into force in 2005.  
42
 IPCC (2014a, p 24); Werksman (2010).  
43
 Treaties and protocols to treaties are, as a whole, legally binding in the absolute sense 
discussed above, with protocols typically being considered “more” binding. On the other hand, 
mere political declarations, political agreements, and (typically) resolutions and decisions of 
international organisations (including decision of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties) are 
not legally binding in the absolute sense. 
44
 (2014a, pp 24–25). 
45
 IPCC (2014a, ch 13.2.2).  
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which the architecture achieves its objective to reduce the causes and impacts of 
climate change.46 
When evaluating effectiveness ex ante, we are concerned with how likely it is that a 
particular architecture will achieve its objective to reduce the causes and impacts of 
climate change. This can usefully be analysed by considering the effect of the 
architecture on:47 
• Ambition — individually, ambition refers to the level or stringency of a state’s 
commitment, i.e. the extent to which it contributes to the global mitigation 
effort;48 the collective ambition is the aggregate of countries’ individual 
commitments (which ultimately determines the climatic outcome); 
• Credibility — the perceived likelihood of individual states’ commitments being 
implemented.  
3. Two key considerations for designing an effective international 
policy architecture 
This section of the paper considers two sets of issues that are of central importance 
in designing an effective climate policy architecture. Where relevant, examples will be 
given from historical international climate negotiations and agreements (especially 
the Kyoto Protocol). This discussion provides important analytical background to the 
argument in Part 4 regarding the policy architecture for the main agreement in Paris 
2015, and for international cooperation more generally.  
a) The interplay between international architecture and domestic factors 
International agreements are negotiated voluntarily by states, and states are 
represented by governments who have diverse interests and face diverse internal 
pressures. Domestic factors — the values of the political party in government, 
economic considerations, business and other elite preferences, public opinion etc. — 
typically have a strong influence over states’ positions during international climate 
negotiations, as well as over the implementation of international agreements (and 
over the development of domestic climate policy generally); arguably a much 
stronger influence than international factors.49  
Moreover, many of the entities that have direct control over emissions-causing 
processes (factories, cars etc.) are individuals and firms rather than states 
themselves.50 Since only states have relevant jurisdiction over individuals and firms, 
the effectiveness of international climate cooperation depends strongly on the 
willingness and ability of governments to develop climate policies and pass laws that 
implement (and surpass) international commitments. 
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 IPCC (2014a, p 11). The IPCC refers to this as “environmental effectiveness”. Other criteria 
might include “efficiency” and “equity”. 
47
 Another variable, participation, could also be considered (e.g. Bodansky 2012). In effect, I 
consider participation as a factor affecting ambition: a state with low ambition will not 
participate. 
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 See IPCC (2014a, pp 17, 27). Ambition could also refer to a state’s contribution to 
adaptation, however this paper focuses only on mitigation. 
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 Dai (2010). See Hafner-Burton et al. (2012, pp 69–72) for an overview of political science 
research on the effect of domestic politics on states’ international behaviour. 
50
 This can be contrasted with, for example, international law regarding nuclear weapons, 
where governments themselves typically own and control the relevant weapons. Of course, 
many governments do own or control emissions-intensive assets, particularly in the energy 
sector. For example, the Climate Policy Initiative found that governments own 50-70% of 
global oil, gas, and coal resources (Nelson et al. 2014). 
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The design of an international policy architecture should therefore be influenced by 
an understanding of how domestic factors affect international cooperation, and how 
cooperation affects domestic climate policy (and, ultimately, domestic emissions).51  
i) The interplay between international bindingness and domestic ambition and 
credibility 
In its most recent assessment report, the IPCC’s Working Group III (mitigation) 
concluded that: “Research has not resolved whether or under what circumstances a 
more binding agreement elicits more effective national policy”.52 Part of the difficulty 
is that there are multiple effects at work, potentially pulling in different directions. By 
analysing these effects in particular contexts, good predictions can be generated. 
Effect #1: Greater bindingness increases the credibility of states’ commitments 
Other things being equal, the more binding and centralised the relevant provisions of 
an agreement are, the more likely it is that a state will implement domestic policies 
that meet its international commitments (i.e. the more credible those commitments 
are).53 This is generally thought to be the case for three reasons: first, greater 
bindingness indicates a more serious commitment to comply with the substance of 
an agreement/provision.54 Second, the greater the bindingness (and centralised 
enforcement) the greater the costs to a state of non-compliance (e.g. damage to 
reputation internationally and domestically, loss of mutual cooperation from other 
states, financial costs, sanctions etc.).55 Third, internationally binding commitments 
trigger domestic institutional and legal processes, before and/or after ratification, that 
make compliance more likely.56 Under many countries’ domestic constitutional 
arrangements, ratification of a treaty can impose direct obligations under the 
country’s domestic law or require domestic institutions (e.g. the judiciary, the 
executive or the parliament) to engage with the international agreement.57  
The high degree of bindingness embodied in the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions targets58 
could therefore, in theory, partly explain why most states achieved their targets. But 
this effect seems likely to have been small under Kyoto.59 In particular, many 
scholars (and no doubt many countries) considered the Kyoto sanctions for non-
compliance to be non-credible, thus suggesting that they are unlikely to have been a 
                                            
51
 The effect of international cooperation on states’ domestic behaviour is particularly difficult 
to evaluate empirically, because the counterfactual cannot be observed and there are so 
many other important factors at the domestic level; we cannot be sure what particular states 
would have done in the absence of the relevant agreement (or under a different agreement): 
see Hafner-Burton et al. (2012, part IV); Simmons and Hopkins (2005); Mitchell (2008).  
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 IPCC (2014a, p 26). 
53
 See Raustiala (2005, p 592) and articles there cited. See Bodansky (2003) and Rajamani 
(2009) for expressions of this position in the climate change context. 
54
 Raustiala (2005); Bodansky (2003); 
55
 Bodansky (2003).  
56
 Raustiala (2005); Bodansky (2003).  
57
 Raustiala (2005); Bodansky (2003); Brownlie (2008, pp 45–49). And see the below 
discussion regarding how some countries, including the US, require the involvement of the 
legislature before ratification.  
58
 The Protocol was an internationally binding instrument and hence legally binding on the 
parties to it (i.e. those countries that chose to ratify it). The targets for developed countries 
were intended, moreover, to be strongly binding, in that they were mandatory, specific and 
subject to compliance and enforcement provisions and mechanisms.  
59
 IPCC (2014a, p 59). As the IPCC notes: “Much of [the reduction in emissions from Annex I 
parties, i.e. those with targets] … was due to factors other than measures adopted under the 
UNFCCC, such as the economic downturn in Annex I ‘economies in transition’ (EITs) — 
Russia, former Soviet Republics, and Eastern Europe — during the 1990s.”  
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major cause of high levels of compliance.60 It is certainly the case that the Kyoto 
compliance mechanism failed to ensure that all targets were achieved (e.g. in the 
case of Canada, which withdrew from the Protocol). 
Effect #2: Greater bindingness probably depresses ambition and participation 
We must also consider how states might alter their ambition in the face of policy 
architectures with different degrees of bindingness (and centralisation).  
Raustiala (2005) notes that, from a functional perspective, there are two possible 
relationships between bindingness and ambition: they could be positively correlated 
(because states are more willing to be ambitious in the context of a strongly binding 
agreement if they are concerned about the non-compliance of others, since they can 
be more confident that others will comply with a more binding agreement); or they 
could be negatively correlated (because states are less willing to be ambitious if they 
are concerned about their own non-compliance). As the IPCC explains:61  
Because greater legal bindingness implies greater costs of violation, states may 
prefer more legally binding agreements to embody less ambitious commitments, and 
may be willing to accept more ambitious commitments when they are less legally 
binding. 
Raustiala argues that domestic factors tend to determine the relationship between 
bindingness and a state’s ambition.62 For international environmental agreements, he 
argues that ambition and bindingness tend to be negatively correlated because the 
domestic balance of political-economic power favours constituencies that are against 
ambitious-and-binding forms of cooperation (e.g. high-emitting industries tend to be 
more politically powerful than environmental NGOs).63 
This dynamic can be observed in the climate change context. For a number of 
systemically important, large emitters, it appears that greater bindingness depresses 
ambition. In particular, China, the world’s largest emitter, is very reluctant to enter 
into strongly binding international climate commitments,64 and the same appears true 
of the other large, emerging economies, including India.65 This is systemically 
important, because the ambition of many other states’ commitments, including the 
United States (the second largest emitter), is strongly linked to the level of ambition in 
China and other emerging economies. Thus, it seems likely that stronger bindingness 
in climate agreements would have a strongly depressive effect on the ambition of key 
emitters.  
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 Halvorssen and Hovi (2006); Barrett (2009); Vezirgiannidou, 2009; IPCC (2014a, p 20). The 
Kyoto Protocol’s compliance system is explained in UNFCCC Secretariat (2014c). The 
enforcement actions the Compliance Committee may undertake include “requiring” a non-
compliant party to make-up any shortfall in the next commitment period, with an additional 
30% penalty, and precluding them from participating in international emissions trading.  
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 IPCC (2014a, p 27), citing: Rajamani (2009); Raustiala (2005); Guzman and Meyer (2010); 
Albin (2001); Grasso and Sacchi (2011); Bodansky (1999); Bernstein (2005). See also: 
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Protocol (especially its second commitment period): see Bodansky (2012). 
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 Raustiala (2005, pp 602–603). 
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 Raustiala (2005, p 603). 
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 Yu (2008); Hallding et al. (2012) pp 72–74. China’s hesitancy to accept binding climate 
obligations arises partly from historical mistrust and aversion to international entaglements, 
partly from perceived reasons of unfairness, including in relation to historical emissions, and 
partly from concerns over growth and poverty reduction (though in this area, perspectives are 
changing).  
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 See Hallding et al. (2012). 
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There is a second way in which bindingness — this time in the absolute sense (i.e. 
whether the agreement as a whole is a legal one or not) — appears to adversely 
affect ambition/participation, having to do with domestic treaty ratification processes. 
Different states have different internal procedures for generating the domestic 
authorisation required for the executive to ratify an international treaty.66 In many 
states, the executive government is free to ratify treaties of its own volition, but in 
others the involvement of the legislature is required. This is particularly important in 
the United States. Under its Constitution, the President’s power to ratify a treaty is 
conditional on the Senate providing its advice and consent, by a two-thirds majority.67 
This is a very high threshold to achieve (especially in the current political 
environment), and partly explains why the US has not ratified a number of high-
profile international treaties. During a treaty negotiation process, anticipation of such 
ratification challenges can influence parties’ negotiating position on bindingness.68 
These dynamics were clearly observed in relation to the Kyoto Protocol. First, China 
and other major developing countries did not accept specific, quantifiable emissions 
reduction obligations, leading to an asymmetry between developed and developing 
countries’ obligations. And second, the United States did not participate at all 
because the senate indicated that it would not provide its consent to ratify the 
Protocol (partly because of the asymmetry just mentioned).69 By contrast, the non-
legal, non-binding, and decentralised approach of the Copenhagen Accord attracted 
wide participation, with many states — those accounting for 80 percent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions — willing to make nationally-determined, non-binding 
pledges.70 
Finally, higher degrees of bindingness and centralisation could have an undesirable 
dynamic effect by moderating states’ ambition during the lifetime of the commitment, 
as policymaking effort becomes narrowly focused on compliance. For example, the 
European Union set the scheme cap in Phase II of its emissions trading scheme in 
line with its Kyoto target — while this increased the likelihood of meeting the target, it 
also effectively precluded more ambitious emissions reductions from sectors covered 
by the scheme.71   
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 These procedures may be set out in a state’s constitution, for example.  
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 Constitution of the United States of America art II, s 2. The section refers to the power to 
“make” a treaty, which encompasses single-stage treaty-making processes as well (not all 
treaties require a two-stage process of signature-then-ratification, though major multilateral 
treaties typically do). 
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 See, e.g., Davenport (2014) and the footnote immediately below, regarding the US. 
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 In relation to Kyoto, in July 1997 the US Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution by a 
margin of 95–0, expressing the “sense of the Senate” that:  
the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement 
regarding, the [UNFCCC] at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, 
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(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the 
Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific 
scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing 
Country Parties within the same compliance period, or  
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States. 
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 Briner et al. (2014). The Copenhagen Accord was a political agreement reached at the end 
of COP15 in Copenhagen at the end of 2009, under which a significant number of states 
made voluntary emissions reduction pledges. 
71
 More generally, the potential for this kind of effect is suggested from the evidence on target-
setting in public management. Targets tend to cause “threshold effects” by which 
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The net effect: Greater bindingness is arguably undesirable (at present) 
Since bindingness seems likely to cause both desirable effects (on credibility) and 
undesirable effects (on ambition), it is important to consider the relative strength of 
these effects (which determines the net effect), when determining the appropriate 
level of bindingness for a policy architecture.72  
Given that the benefits of strong bindingness (increased credibility) seem modest and 
that, for the time being at least, strong bindingness seems likely to have a significant 
depressive effect on the participation and ambition of the world’s largest (and most 
systemically important) emitters, arguably the net effect of strong bindingness is 
undesirable. The policy implication is that it would be better to adopt a non-binding or 
weakly binding (and decentralised) approach to the substance of states’ mitigation 
commitments, and focus on encouraging higher ambition from the key emitters.73 
In any case, there are other ways of ascertaining and enhancing credibility that do 
not rely on international bindingness. Domestic factors also affect the credibility of 
states’ commitments,74 and in the climate context they are arguably a better indicator 
of credibility. For example, whether a particular commitment is perceived to be 
credible by others is likely to be influenced by factors such as the domestic 
institutions, laws, policies and measures a state already has in place (or is likely to 
soon have in place) to support and implement its commitments.75  
ii) The interplay between policy structure and ambition 
The policy structure of an international agreement and the collective ambition it 
embodies (to the extent it is perceived as credible) can influence individual 
governments’ domestic climate policy decisions directly and indirectly.  
First, international agreements can have a powerful signalling effect, indicating to 
state and non-state actors the likely evolution of the global climate and the global 
economy, and the associated incentives — costs, benefits, challenges and 
opportunities.76 They can affect beliefs and expectations about changes in future 
technological possibilities, relative prices, institutional and regulatory arrangements, 
social norms and political configurations, for example.77 If an agreement embodies 
strong collective ambition and countries’ individual commitments are perceived to be 
credible, then domestic politics would arguably become more conducive to ambitious 
domestic climate policy (e.g. through effects on domestic incentives, and the 
normative and epistemic context in which domestic policy decisions are made).78 
Second, by affecting the frequency with which states interact with one another and 
the nature of those interactions, the policy structure could affect how such 
expectations and beliefs evolve over time.79 This dynamic aspect of policy structure is 
particularly important for climate change, as relevant technological, economic, 
                                                                                                                             
performance tends to be “crowded” toward the target: see, e.g., Bevan and Hood (2006, 
pp 521–522) for discussion.  
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 Raustiala (2005). 
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 See also Schmalensee (1998). As discussed in Part 4, this does not preclude having other 
binding and centralised elements, for example in regard to MRV, revision processes, etc., as 
arguably stronger bindingess in these areas would not entail such great costs to ambition. 
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 See Hafner-Burton et al. (2012, p 70). 
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ambition of the state’s commitment and the state’s past track record on climate change: see 
Green and Stern (2014) for a discussion of these factors in relation to China. 
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 GCEC (2014, p 280); Hepburn and Zenghelis (2014); Dai (2010). 
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 Hepburn and Zenghelis (2014). 
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 GCEC (2014, p 280); Hepburn and Zenghelis (2014); Dai (2010). 
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 See, e.g., Bodansky and Diringer (2014); Haas et al (1993). 
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political and social factors are constantly evolving in ways that affect states’ climate 
policies.80 
Third, the policy structure of any international agreement could influence the 
structure of domestic policy.81 Recall that one of the reasons states might engage in 
international climate cooperation is to coordinate policy responses, which can in turn 
improve the effectiveness of the collective response.82 Other things being equal, 
policymakers would arguably be more likely to adopt (and domestic non-state actors 
more likely to advocate) a particular policy structure domestically if it has been 
agreed internationally.83 For example, the decision by European and Australian 
governments to adopt emissions trading schemes as the primary mechanism of their 
domestic climate policy structure appears to have been strongly influenced by the 
structure of the Kyoto Protocol (targets and timetables plus emissions trading).84  
Fourth, the policy structure and ambition of an international agreement can affect the 
technical constraints on states’ domestic climate action. States face technical 
constraints on their ambition of differing types and degrees, including in relation to 
financing, technology, and capacity (e.g. labour/expertise, and wider governance, 
institutional and administrative constraints). These constraints are often more acute 
in developing countries, but affect all countries to some degree. Whether and to what 
extent international agreements facilitate the provision of support needed to 
overcome these constraints can therefore directly affect domestic climate policy in 
the countries needing/receiving support.85 
b) The costs and benefits of action 
Recall that, in Part 2(b), it was posited that one reason why states might want to 
cooperate on climate change has to do with the structure of costs and benefits of 
mitigation action: states (or individuals or firms), so the standard characterisation 
goes, will incur immediate and certain private costs from taking action to reduce 
emissions and yet the climate change benefits are long-term, globally public, and of 
uncertain magnitude;86 this creates incentives to ‘free-ride’; and international 
cooperation can alter these incentives so that states reduce emissions.  
Recent research and policy analysis has, however, called into question this simplistic 
characterisation of the cost-benefit profile of mitigation action, and is demonstrating 
the great extent to which well-designed domestic actions can be locally net-beneficial 
over short- to long-term timescales in addition to contributing to global climate 
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 Schlamensee (1998). Dynamic technological and economic changes are discussed further 
in the next section (Part 3(b)). The importance of having a dynamic policy structure is 
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mitigation. These insights have major implications for the design of international 
climate policy architectures. 
i) Local co-benefits  
The first key insight from this research is that many domestic policies and measures 
to reduce emissions would bring local benefits in the short-medium term (i.e. not 
including the global benefits of reduced climate risk), even at current market prices.87 
These include the following: 
• Many resources — energy in particular — are used inefficiently in all 
economies. Policies and measures to increase energy efficiency often save 
resources and therefore bring economic benefits;88 
• In economic downturns (which many countries are experiencing today), 
labour and capital are deployed inefficiently. Climate policies designed to 
stimulate investment into infrastructure, goods and services can therefore 
increase efficiency in the short- to medium-term (while also promoting 
medium- to long-term economic growth);89 
• In many countries there is scope to improve the efficiency of taxation by 
removing fossil fuel subsidies, implementing carbon (and other 
environmental) taxes90 and removing more distortionary taxes;91 
• Many low/zero-carbon substitutes for existing goods, services and processes 
are cheaper than incumbents at current prices (e.g. prices of solar PV and 
onshore wind in many contexts92). When (and in many cases, before) the 
incumbents reach the end of their operational lifetimes, it is economically 
beneficial to replace these with the zero/lower-carbon substitutes (and when 
new units are needed, the latter will reduce emissions growth relative to 
adding higher-carbon incumbents);93 
• There are a great many unpriced costs and benefits that don’t show up in 
conventional price comparisons (e.g. of renewable vs fossil-fuel energy 
generation). When things like air and water pollution, health and safety (of 
workers and the public), biodiversity protection, energy security, visual 
amenity, noise, congestion etc. are taken into account in policy analysis, 
many zero/lower carbon options will bring great benefits.94  
Because of these co-beneficial effects, a large portion of countries’ domestic 
emissions reductions would be locally net-beneficial, and hence in states’ self-
interest to implement (and where net costs are involved, the net costs would be lower 
than otherwise).95 The New Climate Economy report finds that 50-90 percent of the 
emissions reductions needed to put the world on a plausible 2°C pathway by 2030 
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would be net beneficial.96 While the specific sums are contestable (in both directions), 
they suggest that the available pool of locally net-beneficial emissions reductions 
would be large. 
Yet, the fact that many locally net-beneficial emissions reduction opportunities are 
not already being undertaken suggests that countries face other constraints on their 
ambition. One set of constraints is political: policies that are net-beneficial will still 
have absolute costs; how these costs (and the absolute benefits) are distributed 
matters greatly in political terms; and the ‘losers’ from climate policy will often be 
concentrated in particular industries or sectors that are economically and politically 
powerful (e.g. fossil fuel industries and utilities). A second set of constraints is 
technical, as many governments face technical barriers to implementing net-
beneficial climate policies, even when they are politically disposed to do so.97 This 
suggests that, for this large pool of locally net-beneficial domestic mitigation, 
international cooperation should focus more strongly on overcoming these 
constraints than on trying to change the incentive structures states face (e.g. by 
establishing rules with sanctions for non-compliance).  
ii) Dynamic innovation effects 
The second key insight from this research is that strong and well-structured policies 
and investments in innovation — i.e. the research, development, demonstration and 
widespread deployment of low/zero-carbon technologies, products, processes and 
services — would likely bring very high economic (and other) benefits.98  
First, it would likely bring medium- to long-term returns in the form of cheaper 
low/zero-carbon substitutes for existing high-carbon goods and services.99 Indeed, 
the main reason some low/zero-carbon technologies are cheaper than their high 
carbon incumbents at current prices (which fail to account for full costs and benefits 
that would make the former even more attractive) is due to past public and private 
investments in low/zero-carbon innovation.100 With further, and much stronger 
innovation activity, an even larger portion of countries’ domestic emissions reductions 
would become locally net-beneficial. 
Second, and even more importantly, innovation tends to bring wider economic 
benefits in the form of knowledge spillovers that contribute to whole-economy GDP 
growth.101 Empirical evidence suggests that low/zero-carbon innovation produces 
significantly more knowledge spillovers than innovation in incumbent, high-carbon 
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technologies, and many of these spillover benefits accrue to the local economy.102 A 
strong, green innovation agenda is thus also a medium- to long-term growth and 
prosperity agenda.103 As Professor Stern has argued, the “radical change necessary” 
to put the world on a less than 2°C pathway “is on a scale which would essentially 
involve an energy-industrial revolution, or major wave of technological change, and 
experience of previous such changes suggest they are associated with 2 or 3 
decades, or more, of investment, innovation and growth”.104 
Innovation policy has its own complexities: it is hard to do well; the scale of the 
benefits is subject to uncertainty; the timeframes in which benefits accrue can often 
be long; and the distribution of the benefits from innovation is partly private, partly 
public, partly local, and partly global (and the proportions are uncertain). As such, the 
extent to which one country perceives innovation to be locally net-beneficial will 
depend on the quality of its innovation system, and how it treats/discounts future, 
uncertain and non-local benefits. These uncertainties, and the partly-global-public 
benefits that arise from innovation suggest that there is a significant role for 
international cooperation regarding low/zero-carbon innovation. Moreover, innovation 
policies are likely to be more effective if coordinated across countries.105 Again, this 
suggests a more targeted policy architecture is needed at the international level than 
has traditionally been assumed necessary.106 
iii) Residual, locally net-costly mitigation 
Finally, there will inevitably remain (after the full costs and benefits, and potential for 
innovation, are estimated and accounted for) a pool of emissions in each country that 
it is locally net-costly for that country to reduce within the relevant decarbonisation 
timeframe (i.e. for which the benefits are ‘only’ the global climate mitigation benefits). 
These are likely to be concentrated in highly trade-exposed, emissions-intensive 
sectors such as international aviation and transport (so-called ‘bunker fuels’), steel, 
cement, and exported fossil fuels.107 International cooperation in these areas is thus 
likely to require a focus on overcoming incentives to free-ride. 
4. The emerging policy architecture for an agreement in Paris 2015 and 
its likely effectiveness 
The approach currently being pursued in the negotiations leading up to Paris, at least 
since the relevant decision in COP19 in Warsaw at the end of 2013,108 can be 
considered a ‘hybrid’ policy architecture, containing a mix of both ends- and means-
focused policy elements, binding and non-binding elements, and centralised 
institutional elements and decentralised elements.109 This section outlines the main 
options being pursued, and, drawing on the discussion from Parts 2 and 3, considers 
their likely effectiveness (including suggestions as to how effectiveness could be 
increased). 
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a) “Intended nationally-determined contributions” 
The Warsaw COP Decision calls on parties to prepare “intended nationally 
determined contributions” ((I)NDCs) and to communicate them well in advance of 
COP21 in Paris.110 The idea is that the substance of countries’ commitments will be 
largely or entirely a matter for each country to determine domestically. 
While the legal form of these commitments has not yet been resolved, there is a 
consensus beginning to emerge around the idea that NDCs themselves will not be 
internationally legally binding, but that there will be binding obligations with regard to 
process/conduct. As suggested by a number of parties, this could be facilitated by 
incorporating process obligations (e.g. to submit or record an NDC111) in the main, 
legally-binding agreement and to have the NDCs themselves recorded in a separate, 
non-binding document, such as a schedule to the main agreement.112 
Ensuring that the substance of countries’ commitments are nationally-determined 
and are not internationally legally-binding is likely to be desirable from the point of 
view of effectiveness, for the reasons discussed in Part 3(a): it will likely facilitate the 
participation and greater ambition of the largest, systemically important, emitters 
such as China and the US.113 
Moreover, there are ways — under active discussion in and around the negotiations 
— in which the policy architecture of the agreement could improve the credibility and 
ambition of countries’ commitments, both initially (in Paris) and over time, and hence 
increase the effectiveness of the agreement. These are considered in turn below. 
b) The form of commitments: promoting credibility and coordination 
The Warsaw Decision calls on parties to communicate their INDCs “in a manner that 
facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of the intended 
contributions”,114 and calls for the “information that Parties will provide when putting 
forward their contributions” to be determined at COP20 in Lima.115 This suggests 
there will be an element of centralisation that prescribes or limits the form that states’ 
commitments must take, and the information that must accompany them. 
Various options under discussion with regard to the form of INDCs could improve the 
effectiveness of the policy structure. For example, the main agreement could include 
a binding requirement, or a less stringent normative prompt — such as a guideline, 
an expectation, a default rule, or a menu of alternatives (a ‘nudge’,116 if you will) — 
with regard to the following aspects of the form of INDCs:117 
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• Whether it must be a target (end) and/or policies and measures (means); 
• Whether some kind of indicative, longer-term plan (e.g. a decarbonisation 
plan) is to be included; 
• What type of targets are allowed/encouraged (absolute emissions reduction, 
reductions below ‘business as usual’, emissions intensity targets, sectoral 
targets, etc.); 
• Whether targets or measures must be quantified (or at least quantifiable); 
• Whether an unconditional minimum commitment must be specified and/or 
whether a conditional element may be included (e.g. a range of outcomes), 
and what the conditions may relate to; 
• The timeframes of different kinds of commitments; 
• Which sectors and gases are included within the scope of the commitment; 
• Information about the assumptions and accounting rules associated with the 
commitment; and 
• Whether, and what, information is required as to the domestic institutions, 
laws and policies in place to achieve or support the commitment.118  
In light of the analysis in Parts 2 and 3, three of these aspects are likely to be 
particularly helpful in increasing effectiveness.  
First, all parties should be required or encouraged to include means-based elements 
— institutions, laws, policies and measures — within their commitments. Given that it 
is primarily domestic policies that directly affect the production and reduction of 
emissions (i.e. they do most of the ‘work’ in reducing emissions119), focusing states’ 
attention on domestic policy and institutional development would likely promote long-
term effectiveness.120 It would also promote policy coordination in particular sectors 
(since policies tend to be sectorally-focused). Since incentives for domestic mitigation 
differ considerably across sectors, greater sectoral coordination is also likely to 
promote greater effectiveness (see Part 3(b)). 
Second, parties should be required or encouraged to implement their international 
commitments in domestic law (and this reinforces the case for including ‘means’-
based elements, since these typically require legislation/regulation). As a matter of 
international law, there is little that could be done to enforce such a requirement, but 
it would serve a useful normative function by creating expectations of domestic 
implementation, and help to raise the credibility of countries’ commitments.121 
Third, the agreement should require or encourage countries to incorporate at least 
some commitments that have a short (e.g. five year) timeframe, to facilitate regular 
review and revision (discussed further below). 
c) Transparency, review and participation 
The effectiveness of (nationally-determined, non-binding) mitigation commitments 
can also be improved by having centralised and (moderately) binding rules and 
processes for transparent measurement, reporting and accounting, and for regular 
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information-sharing, verification and review.122 In the current context of relatively low 
ambition and trust among parties,123 such a system of MRV could help build mutual 
trust and confidence among parties, enhance the credibility of commitments, and 
enable shared learning, leading to higher ambition from states over time.124  
This spirit of openness could also be fostered by allowing wide participation, 
domestically and internationally, in the formulation, review and revision of parties’ 
contributions. For example, the Paris agreement could include provisions 
encouraging parties to provide domestic opportunities for wide public participation, 
particularly from especially affected groups such as young people, indigenous 
groups, workers/unions, and so on, in the development of the country’s nationally-
determined contributions.125 Internationally, participation could be fostered through 
allowing some kind of ex ante review (in addition to ex post review) of INDCs with 
participation from experts, international peers and civil society observers.126 
Much of this can build on the existing MRV system that has evolved in recent years 
to include more regular reporting for developed countries (Biennial Reports and the 
International Assessment and Review process) and for developing countries 
(Biennial Update Reports and International Consultation and Analysis). 
d) (Upward) revision of commitments 
It is almost certainly the case that countries’ NDCs in Paris will not, in one ‘grand 
bargain’, collectively imply emissions reductions that would achieve the global goal of 
holding warming to less than 2°C above pre-industri al levels. Due to political, 
technical and other constraints on ambition, there will inevitably be a residual 
‘emissions gap’.127 Accordingly, a dynamic policy structure that enables increasing 
ambition over time will be critical to the effectiveness of any new agreement. 
In addition to the ongoing reviews of states’ emissions, policies and measures, the 
Paris agreement is likely to, and should, contain some kind of regular review and 
revision process, whereby parties are expected to update their NDCs. The United 
States, for example, has proposed a five-yearly review and revision cycle, with the 
first commitments being expressed to end in 2025.128 The expectation that 
commitments be revised upwards could be reflected in the agreement.129 
Such a review-and-revision system is likely to promote greater ambition over time on 
the reasonable assumption that domestic constraints on states’ ambition are likely to 
continue to fall over time. As the Submission from the United States (2014) puts it: 
“Political will to take ambitious action is generally increasing over time, technology is 
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advancing, and the costs of action are decreasing. We should design the system to 
capture as much increasing ambition as possible.” For these reasons, US lead 
negotiator, Todd Stern, stated frankly that “we think the target we could put forward 
for 2030 five years from now will be measurably higher than a 2030 target we could 
put forward now”.130 
e) A long-term goal 
One area of the negotiations that is currently unresolved is whether the Paris 
agreement will specify an additional long-term mitigation goal, and if so, what this 
should be.131 
The Cancún decisions in 2010 codified the global goal of holding the increase in 
global average temperature to less than 2°C above p re-industrial levels. However, 
from the perspective of the agreement’s effectiveness, it is questionable how helpful 
this goal is. The main function of expressing a long-term goal is its normative, 
signalling function. However, the signal sent by the 2°C goal is ambiguous, 132 since 
different mitigation pathways imply different probabilities of staying within 2°C, and 
those probability estimates themselves are subject to wide confidence intervals.133 
Accordingly, alternative formulations of the goal have been proposed.134  
One proposal that has received prominent discussion is the goal of achieving ‘net-
zero’ global emissions within the second half of this century.135 The concept is 
derived from an understanding of the emissions reduction pathways likely to be 
consistent with a greater than 50 percent probability of staying within 2°C. 136 
Countries in Paris are unlikely to agree on a specific date for achieving net-zero, but 
if we consider the net-zero by 2050 goal to represent the most ambitious 2°C 
pathway feasible, and net-zero by 2100 (corresponding to a mere 50-50 chance of 
staying within 2°C) to represent the upper limit of  what could plausibly be termed a 
‘2°C goal’, then we can reasonably say that holding  to 2°C will require net annual 
emissions flows to fall to zero by some point within the second half of this century. It 
may therefore be feasible to build consensus around including a statement to that 
effect in the Paris agreement. 
While this half-century window would leave a significant margin of ambiguity, 
expressing the goal in this way would at least be more specific and concrete than the 
2°C formulation and would therefore likely improve the effectiveness of the Paris 
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agreement.137 It would send the clear message that greenhouse gas emissions from 
every country and every sector need to be phased out, and by 2100 at the absolute 
latest.138 As such, it would provide clearer guidance to policymakers, businesses and 
citizens about the desired transition pathways, around which expectations and 
actions can converge.139 Moreover, as it uses a simple number and concept — ‘zero 
emissions’ — it is cognitively undemanding and “psychologically salient”, and 
therefore more likely to be understood, remembered and believed to be credible.140  
f) Finance, Technology and Capacity-Building 
Another important area of great relevance to the effectiveness of the Paris 
agreement is that of FTCB — in particular, the FTCB contributions of developed 
countries to assist developing countries with mitigation and adaptation.  
Within the UNFCCC process, developed countries have agreed to mobilise 
collectively US$100 billion by 2020 for mitigation and adaptation finance, partly 
through the Green Climate Fund. The Paris outcome will need to embody significant 
advances in the public component of this financing if it is to be amenable to 
developing countries. It may be that these financial contributions will treated in a 
similar way to mitigation, with the main agreement containing a reference to, or 
procedural obligations regarding, the provision of finance, but with the actual 
promised amounts recorded in a parallel process or instrument outside of the main, 
legally-binding agreement.141 
Much stronger international cooperation on finance and technological innovation than 
is likely to be embodied in the main agreement will be critical if domestic constraints 
on ambition are to be progressively overcome.142 Innovation is discussed further in 
the next section.  
5. Beyond the Paris Agreement: Additional international initiatives and 
a just domestic transition 
It was argued in the previous section that the mitigation aspects of the emerging 
Paris agreement, if agreed, are likely to be relatively effective (at least compared with 
previous UN efforts), particularly if they include the elements suggested above. 
However, there are many elements that are not currently ‘on the table’ for Paris, but 
which could usefully be the focus of international cooperation and domestic action.  
a) International initiatives for ‘narrower and deeper’ cooperation 
Given the scope for effective international cooperation on innovation and policy at the 
sectoral level identified in Part 3(b) of this paper, there would be value in ‘narrower’ 
groups of willing states (and non-state actors) cooperating on ‘deeper’ initiatives to 
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decarbonise particular sectors as a way to complement and expand upon the ‘broad 
but shallow’ main agreement likely to emerge in Paris.143 Some such initiatives have 
already been developed.144 Paris could be a valuable forum for the initiation or 
extension of such initiatives: they could be advanced in the lead-up to, and ‘on the 
side’ of, the Paris negotiations. They could also be reflected and advanced in the 
Paris agreement itself — for example, through states’ NDCs and, in the case of 
energy innovation, through the UNFCCC’s technology mechanism, though this 
seems less likely in the near term.145  
Three such initiatives are suggested below, focusing on the energy sector. 
i) A medium-term goal for electricity sector decarbonisation 
Achieving the phase out of emissions from each sector146 will require strategic 
thinking about the sectoral sequencing of decarbonisation. This is because the 
availability and cost of low/zero-carbon substitutes differs across sectors, and 
because the viability of some phase-out options in particular sectors depends on 
options pursued in other sectors.  
The electricity sector should be the most urgent priority for decarbonisation.147 There 
are several reasons for this prioritisation:148  
• Power generation is a major source of greenhouse gas emissions in most 
countries;149  
• Low-carbon power generation is well-understood and feasible, with many 
options available; and 
• Decarbonised electricity has an important role to play in reducing emissions in 
other sectors, especially transport (through battery-powered electric vehicles 
and rail), residential heating (through ground source and air source heat 
pumps) and potentially some parts of industry.  
Moreover, the electricity sector, fossil fuels and renewable energy are the most 
politically salient objects of the global climate change debate. Major progress in 
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decarbonising electricity could build powerful political momentum towards the 
decarbonisation of other sectors. 
There is therefore merit in a coalition of willing countries agreeing a shared goal to 
decarbonise electricity within the first half of this century — by 2050 at the latest.150 
As the experience in the United Kingdom is demonstrating, it is reasonable to expect 
developed countries to decarbonise their electricity sectors in the next 15 years if the 
right strategies, policies, innovation incentives and investments are implemented.151 It 
would be reasonable to expect developing countries to adopt electricity 
decarbonisation plans on a similar, but somewhat later timescale, given sufficient 
innovation and technical assistance by developed countries. 
ii) Phasing out coal  
Within efforts to decarbonise electricity, there is a strong case for international 
cooperation specifically to phase-out coal.152 Coal is the single largest contributor to 
global greenhouse gas emissions from energy.153 If the world is to stay within 
reasonable carbon budgets, only a small fraction of the world’s remaining fossil fuel 
reserves can safely be burned, and the economic case is strongest for closing coal 
first within the ‘burnable’ margin.154 Moreover, as the Global Commission on the 
Economy and Climate surmised, “pollution from burning coal is a contributor to the 
estimated 3.7 million premature deaths each year from outdoor air pollution, and coal 
production also causes ill health, injuries and deaths”.155 And despite the fact that 
these effects cause economic damages well in excess of the market price of coal in 
many countries, as the International Monetary Fund has recently demonstrated, coal 
remains very lightly taxed in many parts of the world.156 This means there are very 
high co-benefits from substituting away from coal.157  
There are two forms of international cooperation directly concerned with coal that 
could be effective in reducing domestic constraints on phasing out coal.  
The first concerns the consumption of coal, particularly for power generation. The 
Global Commission on the Economy and Climate has argued that high-income 
countries should commit now to end the building of new unabated coal-fired power 
generation and accelerate the early retirement of existing unabated capacity, while 
middle-income countries should aim to limit new construction now and halt new 
builds by 2025.158 Since political and technical barriers are the main reasons for 
continued investment in coal-fired power generation,159 international cooperation in 
declaring the above-mentioned goals could play a valuable normative/signalling role, 
helping to catalyse locally net-beneficial domestic efforts. In a context where coal 
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investments are already coming under increasing threat from a range of different 
sources,160 signalling a ‘no coal’ norm at the international level could potentially lead 
to a political-economic tipping point toward the phasing out of coal. 
The second concerns the production of coal, especially for export, and perhaps also 
the phase-out of recently built coal-fired power generation capacity (particularly in 
developing countries). In both of these cases, the local cost profile of these measures 
is likely to be less attractive to governments, as the costs may outweigh the local co-
benefits (especially where governments own the assets in question).161 In these 
cases, therefore, international cooperation could usefully focus on the coordination of 
production phase outs (with developed countries taking the lead) and the provision of 
financial and technical support to developing countries for whom such measures 
would be locally net-costly.162 
iii) Zero carbon energy innovation 
Zero/low-carbon innovation was identified in Part 3 as an important area for 
international cooperation that could greatly expand technical options and improve the 
cost-benefit profile of local mitigation options. In the electricity sector, international 
cooperation could valuably encompass the following: 
• scaled-up public research and development funding (coordinated national 
funding and, where appropriate, collaborative international partnerships);163 
• public-private regional networks focused on the development and 
demonstration of new and locally-adapted technologies and processes;164 
• promoting green investment banks/public funds to mobilise public venture 
capital for green innovators with high growth potential (this should be in 
addition to the infrastructure function of such banks/funds);165  
• expanded and better coordinated deployment support policies (feed-in tariffs, 
renewable energy obligations, etc.).166 
Importantly, these institutions should reflect the diverse needs and capabilities of 
different types of countries. High income countries should focus more on frontier 
innovation, and other countries on adaptive innovation and diffusion of new 
technologies and processes.167  
b) Domestic implications of a more decentralised international architecture: 
A just transition 
An important implication of the insights in Part 3, and of the hybrid policy architecture 
that is likely to form the basis for agreement in Paris, is that there must be a much 
greater focus on mitigation within countries, as they find their own pathways of 
structural transition to a decarbonised economy.  
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While the net economic benefits from structural transformation would likely be very 
high, some parts of the economy will need to contract, therefore some firms and 
industries will become less competitive and decline, and some workers will lose their 
jobs and face dislocation.168  
There is much that governments can and should do to promote a just transition for 
affected workers and communities in ways that promote and support the 
achievement of the ultimate decarbonisation objectives. Detailed consideration of 
such an agenda is beyond the scope of this paper, however it could include the 
following:169 
• Policies to ensure that the costs of transition are borne primarily by those 
most able to pay, and the benefits redound most strongly to the least well off 
— this can be achieved through the packaging of low-carbon policies with 
progressive fiscal (tax and expenditure) reforms;170 
• Public education and training policies (e.g. funding of schools, technical 
institutions and universities) directed strongly toward participation in a zero-
carbon economy;  
• Targeted support — including retraining and reskilling, and transitional 
financial support — for workers from structurally declining (high-carbon) 
industries to support their transition into growth industries in the zero-carbon 
economy;171 
• Ensure that the zero carbon transition is procedurally just by consulting with 
workers and unions in the policy development process, and by phasing-in 
policies gradually according to a transparent schedule, so that firms and 
workers have a confident sense of future direction and yet have time to adjust 
in the shorter-term.  
While these are largely domestic matters, reference to just transition principles, 
including domestic stakeholder participation in the setting and revision of NDCs as 
suggested earlier, could helpfully be included in an international agreement in Paris. 
6. Conclusion 
The Paris 2015 conference presents an important opportunity for governments to 
negotiate a new international climate agreement. A question of central importance is: 
what kind of policy architecture — what policy structure, degree of centralisation, and 
legal form / degree of bindingness — is likely to be most effective in generating 
sufficient emissions reductions to avoid dangerous climate change?  
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environmental taxation) can be ‘recycled’ in ways that increase incentives for labour market 
participation generally (and increase the efficiency of the tax system overall), such as by 
reducing personal income tax. For discussion, see Goulder (1995), Bowen (2012) and GCEC 
(2014). The progressivity (and hence the fairness) of the tax system can be enhanced if the 
recycled tax reform focuses on reducing the income tax (or other labour-related taxes) paid by 
low and middle income workers. See Green and Stern (2014) for a discussion of policy 
packaging and progressive tax reform with regard to China. 
171
 Policies and investments (and especially public-private partnerships) that incentivise 
private companies to invest more strongly in the education and training of their workforce 
would also be desirable: Mazzucato and Perez (2014).  
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This paper has highlighted the importance of two sets of issues for analysing the 
likely effectiveness of different architectures: the interplay between policy architecture 
and domestic factors; and the costs and benefits of mitigation. It then argued, 
drawing on insights from this analysis, that a hybrid architecture, as appears likely to 
be adopted in the main agreement in Paris, is likely to be relatively effective — at 
least compared with the previous major climate negotiations and agreements — and 
could be made even more effective. In other words, this time is different.  
But will it be different enough? 
The final part of the paper — again drawing on the insights from Part 3 — suggested 
a number of additional (narrower but deeper) international cooperative initiatives that 
could enhance the effectiveness of international climate cooperation overall. These 
could be advanced on the side of the main negotiations in Paris (though they could 
also be reflected in the main agreement in Paris, or at a future time). This part of the 
paper also pointed out some important implications of the likely Paris architecture for 
domestic efforts, namely the need to focus efforts on achieving a deep, timely and 
just transition within countries. 
The work of transitioning justly to a zero-carbon world is just beginning. Paris 2015 
looks like it will help. But on 11 December 2015, when the Paris conference comes to 
a close, the hardest work will remain to be done. 
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